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SYMPOSIUM FOREWORD
Ronald A. Fein*
It’s been just over five years since the Supreme Court’s
widely-criticized decision in Citizens United v. FEC, which swept
away a federal ban on corporate expenditures in federal election
1
campaigns. The decision provoked widespread criticism for the
Court’s rejection of a constitutional distinction between
corporations and natural persons, and its pronouncement that
independent political expenditures, even from corporations,
2
cannot “corrupt” the political process.
The public is remarkably united in its disagreement with both
premises. Multiple polls show that an overwhelming majority of
Americans—about 80% of both Democrats and Republicans—
oppose the Citizens United ruling and support limits on corporate
and union political spending, as well as campaign fundraising and
3
spending in general. And as of this writing, sixteen states—as well
* Legal Director, Free Speech For People; J.D., Stanford Law School, 2003. The
author thanks the other participants at the November 7, 2014 symposium on “Advancing
a New Jurisprudence for American Self-Government and Democracy,” co-sponsored by
Harvard Law School (through academic host Professor John Coates) and Free Speech For
People: Mark Alexander, John Bonifaz, Ben Clements, John Coates, Caroline Mala
Corbin, Kent Greenfield, Deborah Hellman, Rob Jackson, Tom Joo, Lawrence Lessig,
Tamara Piety, Jed Purdy, U.S. Senator Jon Tester, Jennifer Taub, Ciara Torres-Spelliscy,
Larry Tribe, and Federal Election Commissioner Ellen Weintraub. For more information
on Free Speech For People, a public interest advocacy organization formed on the day of
the Citizens United decision, see http://www.freespeechforpeople.org. Four of the
symposium participants who contributed to this issue serve on Free Speech For People’s
unpaid Legal Advisory Committee: John Coates, Tom Joo, Tamara Piety, and Jennifer
Taub.
1. 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
2. See id. at 357, 364.
3. See Nicholas Confessore & Megan Thee-Brenan, Poll Shows Americans Favor
an Overhaul of Campaign Financing, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2015, at A18; Lydia Saad, Half
in U.S. Support Publicly Financed Federal Campaigns, GALLUP (June 24, 2013),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/163208/half-support-publicly-financed-federal-campaigns.asp
x; Mark Sherman, AP-NCC Poll: Public Wants to Limit Influence on Elections by CashRich Outside Interest Groups, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 15, 2012), http://apgfkpoll.com/uncategorized/our-latest-poll-findings-10; Dan Eggen, Poll: Large Majority
Opposes Supreme Court’s Decision on Campaign Financing, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2010
4:38 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/17/AR2010021
701151.html.
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as 665 cities and towns across thirty-eight states—have passed
4
resolutions calling for an amendment to overturn Citizens United.
In the words of Judge Calabresi, the democratic value of political
equality “is so fundamental that sooner or later it is going to be
recognized. Whether this will happen through a constitutional
amendment or through changes in Supreme Court doctrine, I do
5
not know. But it will happen.” Since Citizens United, decisions in
6
areas ranging from campaign finance to corporate religious
7
exemptions have enhanced the urgency of developing new ways
of thinking about the role of money in politics, the role of
corporations under the First Amendment, how corporate law
should respond to Citizens United and its progeny, and, most
importantly, strategies for moving forward.
This symposium issue features nine articles developed from
discussions among an extraordinary assembly of scholars, public
interest lawyers, and public officials at a one-day symposium on
November 7, 2014 at Harvard Law School. The articles in this
issue reflect fresh insights, from both constitutional and corporate
law, on how best to understand the intersection of money, politics,
corporations, and the Constitution. But first, some background.
I. CITIZENS UNITED AND ITS AFTERMATH
Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation, sought to distribute
a video-on-demand documentary criticizing Hillary Clinton
8
shortly before a 2008 Democratic primary election. This plan
appeared to run afoul of a provision of the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002 prohibiting corporations (and unions) from
using general treasury funds to make independent expenditures
9
for “electioneering communication[s].”
Citizens United sued the Federal Election Commission,
basing its primary argument on statutory interpretation. It argued
that a video-on-demand program, which customers would have to
affirmatively select and pay for, did not meet the statutory
4. See
State
and
Local
Support,
UNITED
FOR
THE
PEOPLE,
http://united4thepeople.org/state-and-local-support/ (last visited June 11, 2015).
5. Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 201 (2d Cir. 2011) (Calabresi, J., concurring).
6. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441–42 (2014) (limiting allowable
government interest in regulating political contributions to “quid pro quo corruption” and
invalidating aggregate contribution limits).
7. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774–75 (2014)
(interpreting Religious Freedom Restoration Act to cover business corporations).
8. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319–20 (2010).
9. See id. at 318–19, 321; 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (2014) (transferred from 2 U.S.C. § 441b).
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definition of “electioneering communication.” 10 But Citizens
United also raised a First Amendment challenge. By the time
Citizens United got to the Supreme Court, its argument was
constitutional but narrow. The appeal presented the key question
as “[w]hether the prohibition on corporate electioneering
communications in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(‘BCRA’) can constitutionally be applied to a feature-length
documentary film about a political candidate funded almost
exclusively through noncorporate donations and made available
11
to digital cable subscribers through Video On Demand.” But the
Court’s ultimate decision swept far more broadly, with a number
of remarkable conclusions.
The Court, in a 5-4 opinion by Justice Kennedy, declared that
“independent expenditures, including those made by
corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of
corruption,” and that “[t]he appearance of influence or access . . .
12
will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy.” It
rejected any constitutional basis for regulating corporations’
political expenditures differently from those of natural persons,
describing corporations as Tocquevillian “associations of
citizens” and implying that a law that “exempts some corporations
but covers others” invidiously discriminates against “certain
disfavored associations of citizens—those that have taken on the
13
corporate form.” And as to whether the “citizens” constituting
these “associations” actually support management’s decisions on
political spending, the Court declared that there was “little
evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by shareholders
14
‘through the procedures of corporate democracy.’”
Citizens United thus brought together two areas of law:
campaign finance and the extension of constitutional rights to
corporations. In campaign finance, Citizens United reversed
decades of precedent allowing limits on corporate (and union)
15
political spending. But its seeds had been planted in Buckley v.
Valeo, which treated campaign money as protected “speech” in

10. Id. at 322.
11. Brief for Appellant at i, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 08205), available at http://goo.gl/zOzLqu.
12. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357, 360.
13. Id. at 349, 352, 356.
14. Id. at 361–62 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794
(1978)).
15. See id. at 365 (overruling Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652
(1990) and McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)).
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the first place. 16 As for corporate constitutional rights, Citizens
United represents the culmination of a trend, which began in the
17
18
1880s but was mostly dormant until the 1970s, of extending to
corporate entities many of the rights guaranteed to individuals in
19
the Constitution.
These trends have continued. Just two months after Citizens
United, the D.C. Circuit extended the logic of the Court’s theory
that independent expenditures cannot corrupt to invalidate limits
on contributions to so-called independent expenditure political
20
committees. That gave birth to “Super PACs,” which can receive
unlimited contributions and make unlimited independent
expenditures. Within the next two years, the Court extended
21
Citizens United to the states and invalidated a key feature of
voluntary state public financing systems that gave extra funds to
candidates facing better-financed opponents operating outside
22
the system.
As for corporate rights claims, the Court has wielded the
First Amendment to strike down a state law restricting
23
commercial sale of physician prescription information, and in
the state and lower federal courts, emboldened corporate
plaintiffs cite the First Amendment and the Equal Protection
24
Clause to challenge laws regarding securities disclosures, the

16. 424 U.S. 1, 15–20 (1976) (per curiam) (holding that limits on political
contributions and expenditures are restrictions on speech, not conduct).
17. See Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (asserting that
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause applies to corporations).
18. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447
U.S. 557 (1980) (articulating First Amendment doctrine for protecting “commercial
speech”); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (invalidating
restriction on corporate expenditures in ballot initiative campaigns).
19. See JEFFREY D. CLEMENTS, CORPORATIONS ARE NOT PEOPLE: RECLAIMING
DEMOCRACY FROM BIG MONEY AND GLOBAL CORPORATIONS 72–79 (2d ed. 2014)
(summarizing history of development of corporate constitutional rights).
20. See SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 692–95 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc) .
21. See Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per
curiam) (extending Citizens United to invalidate state campaign finance law prohibiting
corporate political expenditures).
22. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2829
(2011) (invalidating state public campaign financing system that provided extra public
funds to publicly-financed candidates running against privately-financed candidates).
23. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663 (2011) (invalidating state law
regulating sale, disclosure, and use of physician prescription information).
24. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 370–73 (D.C. Cir. 2014), reh’g
granted No. 13-5252 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 18, 2014) (considering First Amendment challenge to
regulation requiring disclosure of whether publicly-traded company’s products contain
minerals traceable to African conflict).
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minimum wage, 25 food labeling, 26 and even a municipal ballot
measure limiting public financial incentives for nonrenewable
27
energy corporations.
Even as the November 2014 symposium was being planned,
the Court issued two more decisions, one each on campaign
finance and corporate rights, raising many of the same themes. In
April 2014, the Court decided McCutcheon v. FEC, invalidating
long-standing restrictions on the total (aggregate) amount that an
28
individual could contribute to federal political campaigns. Just
two months later, the Court issued a controversial corporate
rights decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., allowing a
religious exercise claim by a corporation whose shareholders
objected to federal employee health insurance regulations
29
regarding coverage for contraceptives. It’s safe to say that the
issues of money in politics, and the intersection of corporations
and the Constitution, are not going away anytime soon.
II. THE SYMPOSIUM CONTRIBUTIONS
The conference that gave rise to this symposium issue
consisted of four panels: Corporations and the First Amendment;
Constitutional Dimensions of Corporate Law; Money in Politics
and Democracy; and Beyond Citizens United and Hobby Lobby.
These panels brought together scholars from two quite different
fields of law. As John Coates noted at the outset, for too long
corporate scholars have ignored constitutional law, and vice versa,
25. See Int’l Franchise Ass’n v. City of Seattle, No. 2:14-cv-00848 (W.D. Wash. March
17, 2015) (order denying preliminary injunction) (rejecting First Amendment and Equal
Protection Clause challenges to minimum wage ordinance), appeal docketed, No. 15-35209
(9th Cir. Mar. 20, 2015); Am. Hotel & Lodging Ass’n v. City of Los Angeles, No. 2:14-cv09603 (C.D. Cal. filed Dec. 16, 2014) (considering Equal Protection Clause challenge to
minimum wage ordinance).
26. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14−cv−00117, 2015 WL 1931142 (D. Vt.
Apr. 27, 2015) (granting in part and denying in part motion to dismiss First Amendment
challenge to law regulating marketing and labeling of food produced with geneticallyengineered ingredients), appeal docketed, No. 15-1504 (2d Cir. May 6, 2015).
27. Noel v. Bd. of Elections, No. 1422-CC00249 (Mo. Circuit Ct. May 27, 2014)
(finding that ballot measure denying public financial incentives to nonrenewable energy
corporations and their major business partners violates Equal Protection Clause), appeal
pending sub nom. Jones v. Noel, No. 101630 (Mo. Ct. App. argued May 12, 2015).
28. 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014).
29. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762−66 (2014). The challenge was raised under both the First
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1, and was ultimately decided under RFRA. Of course,
RFRA is “only” a statute. But as a statute, RFRA is unusual—perhaps unique—in its
relationship to the First Amendment. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2760−61 (explaining
Congressional intent in RFRA as restoring religious liberty protections after change in
Supreme Court’s First Amendment doctrine).
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but after Citizens United and Hobby Lobby, these disciplines must
communicate. That said, the symposium’s goals—and those of this
issue—have been practical as well as scholarly. As Senator Tester
noted in his keynote address, it is not sufficient to have the
30
conversation: “it must make a difference.”
John Coates brings empirical perspective to the rise of
corporate First Amendment cases. He sets forth parallel histories
of the corporation and of the First Amendment, noting that the
Amendment played no role in the country’s dramatic economic
expansion from the 19th century through the postwar era. Before
the 1970s, the First Amendment’s role was limited, but mainly
protected individual expression. But after the Court’s decisions
protecting “commercial speech” in Virginia State Board of
31
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. and
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service
32
Commission of New York, corporate First Amendment litigation
exploded. In fact, Coates’s empirical analysis of Supreme Court
and Courts of Appeals decisions indicates that corporations are
increasingly displacing individuals as the beneficiaries of the First
Amendment. This recent (but accelerating) trend, he posits,
presents the “risk of Russia,” as the business sector relies less on
innovation and efficient addition of value, and more on rentseeking through the judicial system. In the end, he warns, this
“corporate takeover of the First Amendment” is not just bad for
33
democracy—it’s also bad for business.
Caroline Mala Corbin and Tamara Piety argue that the
metaphor of corporation as person has led the Court astray.
Corbin dives into Hobby Lobby’s extension of religious liberty to
commercial corporations. Surveying the underlying religious and
secular justifications for protecting religious liberty in the first
place, she argues that none of them apply to business
corporations. The nature of the corporate “person,” she argues,
34
simply does not make it a suitable vehicle for religious liberty.
Piety argues that the personhood framework, and the Court’s
anti-discrimination rhetoric, is misleading and dangerous because
30. See Jon Tester, U.S. Sen., Speech at Harvard Law School: Citizens United,
Democracy, and Ensuring the Rights of Individuals in the Political Process (Nov. 7, 2014)
(transcript available at http://goo.gl/26gha1).
31. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
32. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
33. John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech and the First Amendment: History, Data,
and Implications, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 269 (2015).
34. Caroline Mala Corbin, Corporate Religious Liberty, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 277
(2015).
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it presents business corporations as an embattled minority in need
of the courts’ counter-majoritarian power. She enumerates and
rebuts common arguments minimizing the relevance of corporate
personhood in constitutional analysis, and argues that avoiding
35
this issue obscures important value judgments.
Kent Greenfield and Tom Joo counter that the problem with
Citizens United and Hobby Lobby does not lie in corporate
personhood. In Joo’s view, personhood is a red herring; the root
of the problem is not attribution of First Amendment rights to
corporations, but rather the Court’s analysis of corporate political
spending. He argues that the Court’s naïve trust in “corporate
36
democracy” belies corporate law realities, including boardcentric governance, limited shareholder powers, and the
undemocratic nature of shareholder voting. He posits that
constitutional analysis should consider the structure of corporate
governance, and the fundamental incompatibility of corporate
governance with democratic governance justifies limiting
37
corporate involvement in politics. Greenfield, in contrast,
maintains that the ultimate solution lies in fundamentally
restructuring corporate law. He proposes reforming corporate
governance, by extending management’s fiduciary obligations to
include employees and other corporate stakeholders and by
mandating employee representation on boards, to make the
38
corporate “person” behave more like a real person.
Jed Purdy and Larry Tribe argue that, to think clearly about
moving past Citizens United on the role of money in politics, we
need a better conception of democratic values and civic
engagement. In Purdy’s view, our notion of citizenship is mired in
an economistic, anti-civic culture, and campaign finance reform
must be part of a larger program of revitalizing democratic
culture. Unless we can rejuvenate an egalitarian democratic
conception, distinct from the self-interested marketplace, he
39
fears, we will lose a democracy worthy of the name. Tribe takes
a different path to a compatible conclusion. He emphasizes that
we must speak precisely about the nature of the Court’s error in
Citizens United: not the narrow judgment in that particular case
35.
36.
37.

Tamara R. Piety, Why Personhood Matters, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 361 (2015).
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362, 370 (2010).
Thomas W. Joo, Corporate Speech and the Rights of Others, 30 CONST.
COMMENT. 335 (2015).
38. Kent Greenfield, In Defense of Corporate Persons, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 309
(2015).
39. Jedediah Purdy, That We Are Underlings: The Real Problems in Disciplining
Political Spending and the First Amendment, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 391 (2015).
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(involving a nonprofit that sought to distribute a movie), but
rather the Court’s fundamental conception of First Amendment
values. He argues that, while the First Amendment embraces the
libertarian values proclaimed by the Court, it also embraces
egalitarian and democratic values that the Court ignored. In his
view, campaign finance should be reconstructed with some
judicial humility: recognizing empirical realities and competing
constitutional values, granting the political branches some space
to limit the conversion of economic inequality to political
inequality, and taking a modest approach rather than going “all
40
in” on a particular ideological conception of democracy.
Jennifer Taub and Ciara Torres-Spelliscy discuss practical
solutions to problems created by Citizens United and Hobby
Lobby that are motivated by the language of the decisions
themselves. Torres-Spelliscy examines Citizens United’s concept
of “corporate democracy” from the perspective of “say on pay”
and “say on politics” proposals. She traces the evolution of
shareholder voting on executive compensation, and observes that
management resisted “say on pay” with a laundry list of legal and
policy objections that ultimately suggest a discomfort with
corporate democracy within the executive suite and boardroom.
She observes a similar trajectory at the early stages of proposals
to require shareholder approval of corporate political spending,
and argues that, despite management objections, the law supports
41
giving shareholders a “say on politics.” Taub examines Hobby
Lobby’s focus on “closely-held” corporations as the purest
embodiment of its model of corporation-as-association. She
suggests that the post-Hobby Lobby effort to define the subset of
corporations that meet the Court’s vision—to develop a “Hobby
Lobby Tool”—could be broadly productive. If corporate exercise
of religion can be limited to a tight subset of corporations, based
on structural features of the corporation, then perhaps those same
principles could limit the Court’s expansion of corporate
42
constitutional rights in other domains, such as political spending.
III. CONCLUSION
Citizens United has led to great concern about the direction
40. Laurence H. Tribe, Dividing Citizens United: The Case v. the Controversy, 30
CONST. COMMENT. 463 (2015).
41. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Democracy from Say on Pay to Say on Politics,
30 CONST. COMMENT. 431 (2015).
42. Jennifer S. Taub, Is Hobby Lobby a Tool for Limiting Corporate Constitutional
Rights?, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 403 (2015).
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of our democracy. But as the symposium itself and the thoughtful
contributions to this issue show, there is reason for hope. Thirtyfive years ago, Justice Rehnquist wrote in dissent that “in a
democracy, the economic is subordinate to the political, a lesson
that our ancestors learned long ago, and that our descendants will
43
undoubtedly have to relearn many years hence.” We are now
relearning that lesson, and there is light ahead.

43. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S.
557, 599 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

